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Abstract—Information-centric networking (ICN) is a new 
communication paradigm that shifts the focus from end 
hosts to information objects. Recent studies have shown that 
ICN can provide more efficient mobility support and 
multicast/anycast content delivery compared to traditional 
host-centric solutions. Nevertheless, the ICN solutions 
proposed so far are not very mature from the security 
viewpoint. In this paper, we study one of the most important 
Bloom-filter based ICN forwarding mechanisms and discuss 
its security vulnerabilities. Next, we propose some 
enhancements to this mechanism, which aim at increasing 
its resistance to brute-force attacks. Our proposed solutions 
are supported by simulation studies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognised that the current Internet 
architecture does not cope well with the today’s user 
demands [1, 2]. The Internet is suffering from security, 
mobility, scalability, and quality-of-service issues, just to 
name a few. In recent years, a new communication 
paradigm, namely information-centric networking (ICN), 
appeared with the ambitious goal of solving the 
abovementioned shortcomings [3-5]. ICN marks a 
fundamental shift from the current host-centric 
communication paradigm. Rather than naming the hosts, 
ICN uses the information objects themselves as first class 
citizens. 
The ICN approach has recently been explored by a 
number of research projects, including the Data Oriented 
Network Architecture (DONA) [6], Named Data 
Networking (NDN) [7], Scalable and Adaptive Internet 
Solutions (SAIL) [8], Content Mediator Architecture for 
Content Aware Networks (COMET) [9], and Publish-
Subscribe Internet Technology (PURSUIT) [10].   
Our work is based on the PURSUIT ICN architecture. 
This architecture relies on the concept of the 
publish/subscribe paradigm. This is different from the 
current send/receive paradigm used in today’s Internet. 
The PURSUIT architecture comprises of the following 
network entities: publishers, subscribers, and brokers [11]. 
Publishers advertise the available information objects by 
issuing the publication messages. Subscribers issue the 
subscription messages indicating their interest in receiving 
some information objects. Brokers perform three 
functions, namely rendezvous (RV) [12], topology 
management (TM) [13], and forwarding (FW) [14]. The 
RV is responsible for matching subscriptions with 
publications. The TM is responsible for constructing a 
delivery path for the publisher to the subscriber. The FW 
is responsible for delivering the information object from 
the publisher to the subscriber. 
Each information object in the network is distinguished 
through a pair of identifiers, the rendezvous identifier 
(RID) and the scope identifier (SID). The RID uniquely 
identifies the object within a scope, whereas the SID is 
used to organise the information objects. 
Research efforts on ICN have already provided notable 
solutions in the areas of network efficiency, reduced 
complexity, scalability and reliability, mobility support, 
multicast and caching performance, traffic engineering, 
network coding, etc. However, in the security domain 
much work still needs to be done. 
ICN can be subject to new types of denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks [15, 16]. One possible attack scenario can 
be achieved by exploiting the forwarding function. In [14] 
the authors propose the LIPSIN forwarding mechanism 
for publish/subscribe networks. In [17], it has been shown 
that the LIPSIN mechanism is vulnerable to replay attacks 
which may lead to DDoS. Therefore, in [17] the Z-
formation technique has been introduced to offer a 
distributed-denial-of-service resistant forwarding. In [18], 
the authors analyse the Z-formation technique in terms of 
the scalability of the TM function. In [19], the works of 
[17] and [18] have been extended to prevent brute-force 
attacks on the LIPSIN mechanism. The work of [19] has 
been further improved in [20], where the authors calculate 
an optimal Bloom filter fill factor for reducing the DDoS 
attack probability.  
In this paper, we demonstrate the problem of brute-force 
attacks and improve on the analysis shown in [20]. We 
also propose a solution that makes a balance between 
mitigating brute-force attacks and in the same time be 
scalable for large networks. The rest of this paper is 
organised as follows. In Section II, we provide a brief 
overview of the LIPSIN forwarding mechanism and 
discuss its security vulnerabilities. In Section III, we 
present the brute force attack probability and its reaming 
issue. Section IV, we analyse our proposed solution and 
present the results. We conclude the paper in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The LIPSIN forwarding mechansim 
The LIPSIN [14] is one of the proposed forwarding 
mechanisms in ICN and it is based on Bloom filter [21] 
forwarding. Bloom filters are probabilistic, space-efficient 
data structures that enable fast and cost-effective creation 
and membership tests. LIPSIN uses a Bloom filter to 
encode the source routing path from the publisher to 
subscriber. The encoded path is sent by the TM function 
to the publisher and is used as the forwarding identifier 
(FID) by the forwarding function.  
In order to enable a Bloom filter based forwarding, each 
link in the network is assigned a unique link identifier 
(LID). An LID is an m-bit array with k bits set to 1. That 
is, k is the number of hash functions used to create a LID. 
Typically k is much smaller than m and its value may be 
selected based to some optimization objectives [22], e.g.  
m = 256 bits and k = 5 are typically chosen values [14, 
13]. The number, n, of statistically unique LIDs is given 
by [14]: 
                                  ݊ ൌ ௠!ሺ௠ି௞ሻ!                  (1) 
For instance, if m = 265-bit and k = 5, then n ≈ 1.2 ൈ
10ଵଶ. 
 Recall that the TM function is responsible for the 
construction the delivery path from publisher to 
subscriber. The LIDs of the links belonging to the 
constructed path are encoded into a Bloom filter and sent 
to the publisher. The fraction of ones in this filter is called 
fill factor, ρ. In each network, a maximum value, ρm, of fill 
factor is allowed and hence any packet with a Bloom filter 
of ρ, where ρ>ρm, is automatically dropped. This is 
required because otherwise an attacker could simply 
create a packet of all one values and launch a DDoS attack 
or send unwanted traffic to every user in the network [25, 
24]. A Bloom filter with a maximum fill factor is called 
maximally filled and hence no more LIDs can be inserted. 
In [17] the Bloom filter is called a zFilter and we use this 
term throughout the paper. 
An example of the LIPSIN packet forwarding is 
presented in Fig. 1. Consider one publisher (Pub-A), two 
subscribers (Sub-A and Sub-B) and three forwarding 
nodes (FW-1, FW-2, and FW-3), connected as shown in 
Fig. 1. Each link is given an m-bit LID. For illustrational 
purposes we use m = 8. Our aim is to construct the zFilter 
for the path from Pub-A to Sub-A. This is performed by 
OR-ing the LIDs of the links belonging to the delivery 
path. In this example, the constructed zFilter includes 
LID-1, LID-2, and LID-4, as shown in the figure. When 
the zFilter is ready, the TM sends it to Pub-A. The latter 
will insert the zFilter in the packet header and will send it 
to its attached forwarding node (FW-1). FW-1 will 
perform the forwarding test on each of its outgoing links. 
The test is performed by AND-ing the zFilter with the 
LID of the link. If, and only if, the result is equal to the 
LID, the packet is forwarded via this link. As shown in the 
figure, the packet will be forwarded to FW-2 and then to 
Sub-A, whereas the forwarding test will fail for LID-3 and 
the packet will not reach FW-3. 
B. False positives in LIPSIN 
One of the limitations of the Bloom filter based 
forwarding is the probability of false positives. That is, 
there is a chance that the packet will be forwarded via a 
link that was not included during the Bloom filter creation. 
For example, assume that LID-3 = 00110000 in Fig. 1. 
Since this link is not part of the delivery path from Pub-A 
to Sub-A, the created zFilter is still as shown in Fig. 1. 
However, the forwarding test at FW-1 will give a positive 
result for LID-3, and therefore a copy of the  packet will 
be forwarded also to FW-3. 
Figure 1.   Example of LIPSIN forwarding. 
One obvious drawback of the false positives is that some 
packets are unnecessarily duplicated over some links, thus 
causing the waste of communication and processing 
resources. In addition, as shown in [14, 20], false positives 
can be exploited by malicious nodes for launching brute-
force attacks in the network. Also other types of attacks, 
such as packet storms and forwarding loops are possible 
[25]. 
The probability of false positives f can be calculated if 
the fill factor ρ of a zFilter is known [26, 27]: 
                                ݂ ൌ ߩ௞                               (2) 
A number of proposals have been introduced to mitigate 
the effect of false positives [14, 22, 28]. In [14] the link ID 
tag (LIT) mechanism is proposed. According to this 
approach, d different zFilters are created and evaluated in 
terms of false positives rate. Next, the best performing 
zFilter is selected and its index is included in the packet 
header. 
C. Security vulnerabilities in LIPSIN 
As discussed earlier, the LIPSIN mechanism is 
vulnerable to brute-force attacks. These attacks are 
launched by trying all possible zFilters until one of them 
causes false positives and then will pass the forwarding 
tests along the desired path. Consider a network with m = 
256 bits, maximum fill factor ρm = 0.5, and the number of 
hash functions k = 5. Below we investigate two possible 
scenarios of brute-force attacks. In both scenarios we 
assume that the attacker has obtained a valid zFilter, z, 
representing the path between the source node and the 
target node. 
The first attack strategy depends on whether the zFilter z 
is maximally filled or not. If it is not, that is ρ < ρm, then 
the attack could convert some 0 bits into 1. The new 
zFilter, zi, will be sent by the attacker to the network and 
may cause some false positives over the links from the 
attacker to the valid path. To increase the chance of 
success, the attacker may try all possible combinations of 
maximally filled zi that includes z. 
The second attack strategy can be used when the 
attacker has no any existing valid zFilter, or the existing 
zFilter is maximally filled. In that case the attacker is 
generating random zFilters with the hope that some of 
them will reach the target node due to false positives. If 
packet acknowledgment is supported by the application, 
then the attacker will know that the randomly generated 
zFilter can reach the target.  
In addition to brute-force attacks, the LIPSIN 
forwarding mechanism is also vulnerable to replay attacks 
and computational attacks. A replay attack is when the 
attacker uses a previously created valid zFilter for sending 
non-requested traffic, this type of attack is of course 
possible, and used, in existing IP networks. A 
computational attack is launched by collecting a number 
of valid zFilters and analysing the correlation between 
their bit patterns. However, these types of attacks are not 
covered in this paper.  
D. Security enhancements to the forwarding plane 
Many of the LIPSIN security vulnerabilities, discussed 
in the previous subsection, exist due to the fixed LIDs 
used in the network. That is, when a link is assigned a 
LID, it keeps this LID forever. To overcome these 
limitations, the Z-formation approach is proposed in [17]. 
The main idea is to make zFilters expire after a certain 
time by periodically changing the LIDs. As a 
consequence, the forwarding decisions become dynamic 
and depend on the packet contents, zFilter, and processing 
context. Also a time-bound shared key between the TM 
and FWs is used [29].  
To compute the LIT of each link, a cryptographically 
secure hash function, called Z-formation, is used. This 
function takes four input parameters and produces an m-
bit LIT. The input parameters are the following: 
• Some in-packet content-based information, I (e.g. flow 
ID or RID) 
• Periodically changing time-based secret key, K(t). 
• Port numbers of incoming/outgoing interfaces, In and 
Out, respectively. 
• The optimization index, d, for mitigating false 
positives. 
That is, LIT = Z(I, K(t), In, Out) . Hence, the LITs become 
dynamic and bound to a specific flow, path, and time 
period. The key K is used when creating the 
corresponding LITs of the path. Therefore, the Z-
formation approach essentially assigns a finite lifetime to 
zFliters. As a consequence, it provides better protection 
against replay and computational attacks. However, it 
does not have any impact on the brute-force attacks. 
Therefore, in the following we propose an enhancement of 
the Z-formation technique, which performs well in 
protecting against brute-force attacks. 
III. BRUTE FORCE ATTACK PROBABILTY 
As discussed in Section II.C, the brute force attack is 
launched by causing some false positives over a path. 
Hence, this type of attack depends on the false positives 
probability of (2). Therefore, to attack a target h hops 
away, the attacker would use a random maximally filled 
zFilter and the probability of this attack is given by: 
                                   ௔ܲ ൌ 	ߩ௠௞.௛                                    (3) 
It is also possible to find the number of expected attack 
attempts to reach a target and this can be calculated by: 
                            ݔ ൌ 	 ݈݋ ଵ݃ି௉ೌ ሺ1 െ ݌௥ሻ                      (4) 
where pr is the probability of obtaining at least one zFilter 
after x attempts. Full calculations of attack probability and 
number of expected attempts can be found in [20]. 
In [20], it has been demonstrated that, with a given 
scenario used in [17], an attacker is able to reach a victim 
5 hops away in approximately 23s, using brute force 
attack with 50% probability of success. This scenario 
requires having an attacking node capability of 106 
packets/s which we call attacking rate ar, and also using a 
zFilter with the parameters ρm = 0.5, k = 5 and m = 256-bit. 
Therefore, the authors have proposed a solution that gives 
some improvements of reducing the attack probability and 
subsequently increasing the time required for the attacker 
to successfully guess a valid zFilter with a certain 
probability pr. This required time is called safe window, 
and the aim is to make the safe window as long as 
possible. To achieve a longer safe window would require 
using a lower value of the fill factor ρ when creating the 
zFilter. However, this restricts the number of 1s to be 
inserted into the zFilter and subsequently a limited 
number of LIDs can be supported. This is a negative 
impact as the lengths of supported delivery paths become 
shorter. 
To mitigate this issue, the authors of [20] have suggested 
using the parameters ρm = 0.48, k = 6 and m = 256-bit as 
optimal values in terms of making a balance between 
security and scalability perspectives. These parameters 
support a delivery path containing up to 24 LIDs, and in 
the same time give a safe window of approximately 60 
min. This is considered a significant improvement in 
terms of the safe window which makes the brute force 
attack much harder. In the same study, it also has been 
suggested that LIDs are changed every ∆t = 40 min using 
Z-formation technique.  More details of updating LIDs 
can be found in [21].  
However, here we show that it is more likely that an 
attack can be successful within ∆t of 40 min. In practice, 
when using the same suggested parameters of k, m, ρm and 
same assumed attacking rate, ar, the probability of 
successful attack pr within 40 min is calculated from (3) 
and (4), and as follows: 
ݔ ൌ 40 ൈ 60 ൈ 10଺ ൌ 2.4 ൈ 10ଽ attempts.  
௔ܲ ൌ 	ߩ௠௞.௛ ൌ 0.48ହൈ଺ ൌ 0.00535  
			݌௥ ൌ 1 െ ሺ1 െ ௔ܲሻ௫ ൌ 0.4815	 
This probability is considered unacceptable, and this is 
because an attacker could reach a victim before the 
coming LIDs update takes place. 	 
From the above, it can be seen that there is still a high 
possibility of successfully launching brute force attacks. 
Changing the LIDs more frequently, for instant every 10 
min or reducing ρm further, may help decreasing this 
attack probability within a certain ∆t.  However, this 
would increase the load on the network entities as well as 
the traffic overhead when updating LIDs very frequently. 
Moreover, reducing the maximum fill factor may help 
mitigating the attack but this would negatively impact the 
network scalability. Recall that the results in [20] can 
support up to 24 LIDs, and it has been demonstrated that 
such size of delivery paths can perform well in small and 
medium realistic network topologies. However, it fails to 
support multicast communications in relatively large 
networks (e.g. a network size of |V|= 113, |E|= 183), hence 
reducing the fill factor further is not an efficient option. 
Therefore, a possible solution is to increase the current 
size of the zFilter, m = 256-bit, used in the literature. This 
is because having larger size of zFilters allows a higher 
number of LIDs to be inserted and also keeps the 
maximum fill factor as small as possible. This would  
improve the security in the network by significantly 
decreasing the probability of launching brute force attacks 
within a certain period. 
In this work, we analyse the impact of the parameter m 
on attack probability, safe window and also the network 
scalability in terms of maximum number of supported 
LIDs. We also compare the scalability performance of the 
forwarding plane when using larger m with the current 
used one. For each size of m, we also investigate the effect 
on the traffic overhead. This is because using larger sizes 
of zFilter requires more space to be dedicated in the 
packet header, which increase the traffic utilization.  
IV. BRUTE FORCE ATTACK ANALYSIS 
A. Simulation Setup 
When comparing zFilters of different sizes, one of the 
aspects is to investigate the capacity of maximum allowed 
fill factor. This is done by observing how many LIDs, n, 
the zFilter can support. We experimentally investigate this 
by running a simulation with 2×106 iterations. In each run 
we select the parameters m, k, and n, and in each iteration 
we create a zFilter z. Then we observe the number of 
unique positions of 1s, s, which tells us how many 1s are 
included in z. Then we calculate ρm according to the 
following: 
				ߩ௠ ൌ ௦௠                                       (5) 
After running the experiment, we record the maximum 
value of ρm found among the results and consider it as the 
maximum allowed fill factor for the given parameters. The 
experiment is performed for different sizes of m while 
keeping the other parameters fixed.  
Another important factor to look at is the impact of the 
delivery path size on the safe window when using 
different values of m and k. According to the results of ρm 
and n obtained from the experiment, and using the same 
attack scenario explained in Section III, we calculate the 
number of the attack attempts, x, using (4). Then, with the 
attacking rate ar which in this paper is assumed to be 106 
packet/s, we find the safe window by: 
                            ݂ܵܽ݁	ܹ݅݊݀݋ݓ ൌ ௫௔ೝ                            (6) 
B. Results 
Figure 2 shows the maximum capacity of ρm for different 
values of n. Each curve represents a different size of 
zFilter. We consider the following sizes: m = {256, 384, 
512, 768}. Generally, it can be noticed that when using 
larger zFilters, a smaller value of ρm can support longer 
delivery paths containing n LIDs. For example to support 
a delivery path of 23 LIDs with the case of using a zFilter 
of m = 256-bit, the maximum fill factor ρm has to be at 
least 0.429, whereas for same n but with larger m of 512-
bit, we can support the same path with smaller value of ρm 
and is equal to 0.224. Recall that small values of ρm are 
desirable to mitigate brute force attacks. Also it can be 
seen that as n increases, the difference of ρm between each 
m increases.  
In Fig. 3 we present the safe window for different n. 
Note that the safe window scale is logarithmic to allow 
fitting the results into one plot, so the difference between 
the results seems less, at first site, than it actually is. The 
results are presented for two sizes of the zFilter m = {256,  
 
Figure 2.  Impact of increasing the number of LIDs on the maximum 
fill factor for different size of m and k = 5. 
512} and three different numbers of hash functions, k = 
{4, 5, 6}. Overall the safe window decreases as n 
increases for both sizes of m. Also it can be seen that 
when using m = 512-bit, the safe window becomes in the 
magnitude of approximately 106 longer than that when m 
= 256-bit. For instance, when using a zFilter of (m=256, 
k=5 and n=23), this gives a safe window of approximately 
103s whereas in a zFilter with same parameters but larger 
m of 512-bit the safe window increases to approximately 
6×109s. This is because in the larger zFilter, 23 LIDs can 
be accommodated with a smaller ρm, and this makes the 
attack time longer to be achieved.  
One advantage of using a larger zFilter is the ability to 
achieve a longer delivery path than possible with a small 
zFilter while keeping the safe window almost same. For 
example, in the figure, a safe window of approximately 
103s can be gained when using a zFilter of (m=256, k=6, 
n=23), whereas it also can be obtained with a larger zFilter 
of (m=512, k=6, n=49). This is a significant improvement 
of almost a double in the number of LIDs to be inserted in 
the zFilter. This is applied to the other sizes of m. 
Therefore, a network setup with the optimal parameters 
as suggested in [20], which uses a 256 bits zFilter and k = 
6 can support up to 24 LIDs for a safe window of 
approximately 60 min. However, a network that uses 512-
bit zFilters and same parameters of k and n, can resist up 
to 76×107 min before a successful attack. Moreover, in the 
later network if we change the LIDs every 40 min then the 
 
Figure 3.  Impact of increasing n on the safe window for different m 
and k with number of hops (h) = 5 and pr = 0.5. 
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Figure 4.  Impact of s on the safe window for different m, k, when 
attacking a victim 5-hop away with probability (pr) of 0.5. 
probability pr that the attacker gets succeed within this 
period is 0.001 whereas it is 0.481 in the network using 
256-bit zFilters. This significant reduction in the attack 
probability helps to discover an attack in progress by 
observing the number of packets dropped at ingress due to 
non-matching zFilters. 
In Fig. 4, we show the relation between the number of 
positions set to 1 in the zFilter, s, and the safe window for 
two sizes of zFilter m = {256, 512} and each with k = {4, 
5, 6}. Generally, it can be noticed that as the number of 1s 
increase the safe window decreases. This is because 
having more 1s increases the probability of false positives 
which helps the attacker to reach a victim in short time. 
For example, using a large zFilter of 512 bits, we can 
insert more 1s and subsequently accommodate more LIDs 
with an acceptable safe window. This can be seen from 
the figure when using a zFilter with the parameters (m = 
256-bit, k = 5, s = 142), the safe window is approximately 
2 min whereas for zFilter of (m = 512-bit, k = 5, s = 141) 
the safe window is around 7×106 min. 
In Fig. 5, we present the probability of a successful 
attack within 40 min, against the maximum fill factor. We 
show how ρm and pr may be traded off against each other 
to achieve desired network design goals. The results are 
based on the attack scenario assumed in this paper (i.e. an 
attacker is 5 hops away from his victim and the attacking 
rate is 106 packets/s). For instance, to have an attack 
probability as low as 1.2×10-9 using any size of zFilter 
with k = 7, ρm should not exceed 0.3. We can also see that 
a zFilter with k = 4 is not secure to be used when ∆t = 40 
min, especially when ρm ≥ 35 as pr becomes almost 1.  
Using a large zFilter does not only improve the network 
security, but it also keeps the false positives rate, f, 
sufficiently low. This can be seen in Fig. 6, where the 
influence of increasing the number of LIDs on the false 
positives is presented. In this figure, we show the average 
false positives rate when using different sizes of zFilter m 
= {256, 512} with k = {4, 5, 6} and h = 5 using (1). 
Generally it can be noticed that when m is 512-bit, the 
false positive rate is significantly lower than when m is 
256-bit. Also in this figure, while the performance of f is 
almost the same when using m of 256-bit for all values of 
k, it gives the best performance when using the parameters 
m = 512 bits and k = 6, and especially for higher n. 
 
Figure 5.  Impact of increasing the fill factor (ρm) on attack probability 
to reach a victim 5-hop away using any size of m. 
 
Figure 6.  False positives rate (f) as function of the number of LIDs (n), 
for 5 subsequent hops. 
C. Discussion 
One of the negative impacts of using large size zFilters 
(e.g. m = 512), is the introduction of extra traffic in the 
network. Therefore, in this section we compare the total 
network utilisation, including the actual useful data sent 
and traffic overhead, for two different sizes of zFilter, m = 
{256, 512}. To do so, we calculate the header size of the 
ICN packet assuming  basic fields are used as shown in 
Fig. 7. Using larger zFilters comes at the expense of actual 
data required to send per packet. This is because the 
current maximum transmission unit is 1500 bytes 
including data, zFilters and the other fields. Therefore, 
when using zFilters with sizes of 256 bits and 512 bits, the 
maximum actual data to be included in the payload are 
1404 and 1372 bytes, respectively. The traffic overhead 
when using a specific zFilter size depends on the 
distribution of Internet packets size. Therefore, we use an 
Internet traffic trace collected on March 2014, and 
containing 91×106 packets [30]. For each packet, we 
deduct the zFilter size from the packet length in order to 
find the useful utilised data. Using the traffic distribution 
from this data set we find that there is a total overhead of 
31.2% when using a 256-bit zFilter and 38.3% when using 
a 512-bit zFilter. For the equivalent IP based transport 
there is 14.2% and 21.3% overhead for IPv4 and IPv6, re- 
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Figure 7.  Basic fields on ICN packet header  
spectively. While the larger 512-bit zFilter has a small, but 
significant, increase in overhead it comes with the 
advantage that it provides good mitigation against brute 
force attacks and with reduced false positive rate. With the 
use of the zFilter security mechanism we have an increase 
in the overhead compared to IP. However, this has the 
significant advantage that it is very difficult (or unlikely) 
for an attacker to send unauthorised traffic to an arbitrary 
end host, effectively stopping attacks such as DoS which 
are common in IP networks. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyse the LIPSIN ICN forwarding 
mechanism and reveal its security vulnerabilities. In 
particular, we reveal that the Bloom-filter forwarding 
approach used in LIPSIN can be used for launching brute-
force attacks to end users and network infrastructure. We 
study the impact of various LIPSIN parameters, such as 
Bloom filter size and maximum fill factor, from the 
security viewpoint. Next, we propose efficient solutions 
that increase the safe window and decrease the attack 
probability. Our proposed security enhancements are 
verified by simulation studies. 
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32 bytes zFilter   32 bytes RID  32 bytes SID  
Payload 1404 bytes 
Payload 1372 bytes 
64 bytes zFilter   32 bytes RID  32 bytes SID  
Using a zFilter of 512-bit:
Using a zFilter of 256-bit: 
